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Knowledge Issues In The Introduction of CRM Systems:
Tacit Knowledge, Psychological Contracts, Subcultures and Impacts
David Finnegan and Leslie Willcocks, Warwick Business School, Warwick University
Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom, grizzfinnegan@blueyonder.co.uk,
Willcockslp@aol.com

Abstract
This exploratory case study research applies a processual analysis (Pettigrew, 1997) to the
implementation of a Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system from a knowledge
management perspective to a contemporary (1999-2004) situation within Birmingham City Council.
A specific focus is given to areas neglected in previous CRM studies - sub-cultures, psychological
contracts, how tacit knowledge is surfaced and transferred, and with what effects on implementation.
It investigates how the system stakeholders and the information system (IS) itself evolved through
encountering barriers, sharing knowledge, finding new uses, inventing work-arounds. A rich picture
emerges of sub-cultural silos of knowledge linked with psychological contracts and power-based
relationships influencing and inhibiting adoption and acceptance of the CRM system.
Keywords: Knowledge Management, Customer Relationship Management Systems, Psychological
Contracts, Implementation

1.

Introduction

CRM is emerging as a key element in system integration. It has attracted a lot of attention, a
high failure rate, but also CRM systems remain very understudied academically. Linkages between
knowledge transfer and psychological contracts also remain understudied in the implementation of a
CRM, or indeed any other, system. Exploratory intensive case research is a highly useful device for
providing insights into these issues. The research was carried out as part of a processual analysis
(Pettigrew 1997) to understand the process of implementation of a CRM system from a knowledge
perspective in a contemporary situation in one organization. The research intends to secure an
improved understanding of the mechanisms and patterns of the implementation processes of a CRM
system at Birmingham City Council, United Kingdom. After a critique of the relevant literature, we
detail the research methodology, then describe, analyze and draw implications from the case.

2.

Literature Review

There are five research literatures relevant to this study, that can usefully be brought together
to provide a lens for analysing the selected case history. These studies cover IT implementation,
organizational cultures and sub-cultures, knowledge and its transfer, psychological contracts, and
Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems.
On implementation, Rogers (1983) has identified five conceptual characteristics of
innovations that help explain adoption rates: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability
and observability. The research literature supports strongly Rogers’ (1983) first three characteristics as
major determinants of IS success or failure defined typically in terms of IS usage and/or user
satisfaction with the system (Cooper and Zmud 1990; Kwon and Zmud 1987; Tornatzki and Klein
982). Kwon and Zmud (1987) developed a stage model of implementation, while Davis (1989) argued
that perceived usefulness is a strong correlate of user acceptance. In such representative studies, the
importance of knowledge sharing and shared psychological contracts is implicit, but not explicitly
stated or researched. Davidson (2002) argues that frames and shifts in frame salience influence sensemaking during requirement determination, while Orlikowski and Gash (1994) show shared frames as
closely related to the concept of subcultures. According to Geertz (1973) and Van Maanen and Barley
(1985), subcultures rely heavily on cognitive elements such as common frames of reference.
Pre-existing structures and cultures may shape differing stakeholder perceptions regarding the
new system and its implementation and performance. While the literature on organizational culture is
large, that referring explicitly to IT implementation is surprisingly small. An early survey done by
Waterhouse (1991, 1992) found 47 percent of UK IT directors stating that their main problem was the
culture gap existing between IT and business professionals, with 56 percent believing that the culture
gap was losing or seriously delaying IT opportunities for their company to gain competitive
advantage. The management literature is replete with various subsequent attempts made to improve
the communication and participation between the subcultures to enable a successful implementation of
an IT system (Wright-Cummings, 1997). However, these efforts have rarely investigated the factors
enabling and inhibiting communication across subcultures from a knowledge perspective (for
examples see Louis, 1985; Boland and Tenkasi 1996; Nonaka 1994; Davis and Olson 1985; Mumford
et al. 1978; Bostrom and Heinen (1977); Checkland 1981; IBM 1977). These studies showed that the
need for improving communication between subcultures is vital. These attempts so far, however, have
not investigated in depth the cultures within IS implementation, but especially the ‘culture behind the
clicks’ represented by the developers, programmers and technicians, and the resulting distinctive
perspective on the implementation process that might result.
Strong hierarchical enterprises prevent smooth cross-functional communication and
consequently inhibit cross-functional cooperation or knowledge sharing. Breaking down hierarchies
can enable knowledge transfer (Nonaka 1994). However, organisations that maintain hierarchical
levels and silos will not encourage it. Knowledge in such organisations frequently becomes ’sticky’
that is, residing in one area or silo and not easily moved to the other parts of the organisation (Bartlett

and Ghoshal 1998). The non-codified techniques play an important role in industrial production and in
technical and technological innovation (Perrin 1990).
Anderson and Schalk (1998); Makin et al. (1996); Rousseau (1995); Shore and Barksdale
(1998); Thibaut & Kelley, (1959) argue that psychological contracts play an important role in the
outcome of interaction between individuals. Psychological contracts can link to knowledge issues
where knowledge is construed as situated practice and as culture, and culturally and historically
specific tools and concepts (Brown 1998; Schulze and Leidner 2002). The extent to which an
employee and employer feel obligated to one another takes place as follows: mutual high obligations,
mutual low obligations, employee over-obligation, and employee under-obligation (Shore and
Barksdale 1998).Whilst studying a variety of psychological contracts, Janssens et. al. (2003) used a
feature-oriented approach across a large, representative sample that covered different hierarchical
layers and relevant professional categories. Six different clusters were found: loyal, instrumental,
weak, unattached, investing and strong. These were discovered to have different patterns of employer
and employee obligations, a different profile and different levels of affective commitment and
employability. This study, however, does not explore a relationship between the type of psychological
contracts and the knowledge transfer. To date few links have been established between knowledge
transfer and psychological contracts.
A survey done by ‘The Data Warehousing Institute’ (TDWI Industry Study, 2000) found that
41 % of the organisations with CRM projects were either experiencing difficulties or close to failure.
The survey further revealed that 91 % either have or plan to deploy a CRM solution in the near future,
but that only 22% of companies have appointed a chief customer officer to facilitate change. Failure
rates of CRM projects may be as high as 70 % (Tafti 2002). As Ciborra (2000) bluntly states, "CRM
seems to have no built-in mechanisms by which it acquires its own momentum and (by which) the
diffusion becomes a self-feeding process”. The studies so far have looked into the macro level
interaction in the paradox of CRM. This research will investigate the micro level interactions in a
‘transformational’ CRM project (Goodhue et al. 2002).
Our review has aimed to integrate of disparate literatures in order to provide a set of lenses
and concepts to further study the introduction of a CRM system. This integration is shown in Figure 1.

IT Implementation Process
Complexity (Rogers 1983)
Adaptation, acceptance, routinisation and infusion (Kwon and Zmud 1987)
Differential interest, expectations, perceptions (Long and Fahey 2000)
Role of IT as enabler (Avgerou 2000)
‘Process’ in Pettigrew’s (1985) five-fold framework
Orlikowski and Tyre (1994); Orlikowski W.J, Hofman D (1997; Orlikowski W.J and Iacono C.S. (2001)
Changing Frames, Orlikowski and Gash (1991); Technology Frames, Orlikowski and Gash (1994)
IS Implementation Myers (1995, 2003), Walsham and Waema (1994)
Technology Frames and Framing, Davidson (2002)

IT Implementation and Culture
• Organisational Culture, Corporate Culture
(Alvesson 2002).

Knowledge Management
• Spiral of organizational knowledge creation (Nonaka et al.
1996).
• Knowledge Creation, Knowledge diffusion and
implementation knowledge use (Rogers 1995)
• Agenda formation, Selection /Implementation
Routinization (Clark et al. 1992)
• Networking approach, community approach and cognitive
approach (Newell et al. 2002)

• Culture led change (Claver et al. 2001)
• High and low context culture (Agar 1994)
• Mechanistic and Organic Culture (Burns and Stalker 1961)

Subcultures and Culture Gap
• Boundary between the "technical" and
the "social" (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis
1994)
• Culture gap between IT and business
professionals (Waterhouse 1991, 1992)
• Culture gap between computer specialists
and business users (Fincham 1994;
Grindley 1992; Hinton 1994; Kumar and
Bjorn-Andersen 1990)

• Sub-culture behind the clicks
representing the IT experts.

• Sub-culture representing
business experts

• Sub-cultures at different
level of hierarchies
(management)

• Sub-culture representing
end-users

Knowledge Transfer
Aids/ Barriers
• Hierarchies (Nonaka, 1994)
• Differences in cognitive and emotional
orientations
(Lawrence and Lorsch 1967)
• Silo/Sticky Knowledge
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998)
• Creative abrasion (Leonard Barton 1995)
• Illusion of consensus (Gee 1992)
• Fear as an emotion
(Pfeffer and Sutton 1999)
• Informal setting (Van- Maanen 1986)

The literature review gives a special focus to subcultures, and how tacit knowledge is surfaced and
transferred, and with what effect on the adaptation and
acceptance of a CRM system.

Tacit Knowledge
• Tricks of the trade
(Vincenti 1984 Orlikowski
and Tyre 1994)
• Tacit Knowledge is implicit
(Polanyi 1967)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Explicit Knowledge
• Descriptive and transcriptive
knowledge (Vincenti 1993)
• Externalisation (Nonaka and
Takuchi 1995)
• Analogies and metaphors
(Nelson and Cooprider
1996)

Knowledge Transfer & Psychological Contracts
Breaking down hierarchies (Nonaka, 1994)
Non-codified techniques (Perrin 1990)
Mutual perspective taking (Boland and Tenkasi, 1996)
knowing of what others know (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967)
T-shaped skills
(Iansiti, 1993)
Shared context for knowing (Newell et al., 2002)
Thompson and Walsham (2004)
Psychological Contracts
(Anderson and Schalk, 1998; Janssens et al. , 2003;
Makin et al. 1996; Rousseau 1990, 1995; Thibaut & Kelley
1959)
Perceived obligations, Shore and Barksdale (1998)

Implementation of CRM Systems:
Failure rates of CRM projects may be as high as 70 % (Tafti 2002).
"CRM seems to have no built-in mechanisms by which it acquires its own momentum and (by which) the diffusion becomes a
self-feeding process”, (Ciborra 2000).
TDWI Industry Study, 2000 found that 41 % of the organisations with CRM projects were either experiencing difficulties or
close to failure.

Figure 1:

Hierarchy of Linkages between IT System Implementation, IT Implementation and
Culture, and Knowledge Management Issues.

3. Research Approach
Initial analysis of issues regarding knowledge transfer across the key subcultures of the
implementation process of a CRM system, has generated the following exploratory organizing
research questions:
(a) ‘How is tacit knowledge surfaced and transferred across, or blocked and
contained within key subcultures and with what effect on the adaptation and
acceptance of a CRM system?’
(b) What is the role of psychological contracts in the process of CRM systems
implementation?

This study uses Pettigrew’s (1985) five-fold framework to analyse the internal and
external contexts, history and the process and content of change. The framework has been
widely used in management of change and IS research (Margetts and Willcocks 1994). Time
and history are central to processual analysis, enhancing the understanding of the
contemporary situation at the research site (Pettigrew 1997). We employ a longitudinal case
study approach to collect and critically analyse empirical data. The research into the period 2001-2005
was carried out across the period January 2003 to August 2004. The case study approach is the most
commonly used qualitative method for research in information systems (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991).
The techniques for collecting data included historical analyses, including data from project reports and
minutes of project team meetings; attending informal staff meetings; participant observation; and
conducting interviews with stakeholders. The use of observation as a method of data collection is well
documented (Bell 1992). The variety of methods chosen to gather data (historical analyses, interviews
and taking of field notes) created a useful form of triangulation (Yin 1994). According to King
(1994), an in-depth interview is a direct personal interview in which a single respondent is probed by
an interviewer to uncover underlying motivations, beliefs, attitudes and feelings on a topic. It has a
low degree of structure, a high proportion of open questions and a focus on specific situations and
action sequences in the interview process (King 1994). Fifteen semi-structured interviews were
conducted with the stakeholders of the CRM system. The interviews were loosely structured
consisting of open-ended questions mapping the area to be explored, at least initially, whilst allowing
the interviewer or interviewee to diverge in order to pursue an idea or response in more detail.
Interviewees included people from senior management, middle management, technologists, and endusers of the CRM system at each site. Having transcribed the recorded interviews, colour coding was
used to help in analysing the data. Colour coding helped to increase the consistency of the analysis. It
also facilitated searching, marking up, linking and reorganising data in a short period of time (Denzin
and Lincoln 2000). The data from key stakeholders from different sites were compared to find the
similarities and dissimilarities across the case. We recognised throughout that the process of sifting
and sense-making developed an interpretation of interpretations (Stanmark 2000). The approach and
assumptions of this research fall into the interpretive discourse as defined by Schulze and Leidner
(2002).

4.

Case Study: Birmingham City Council (BCC)

4.1
History and Context
Under this section we describe briefly the history and context for IT at BCC. Birmingham City has
evolved from being the UK’s cultural capital to one of Europe’s premiere conference and public
events cities. Birmingham is a lively, prosperous and cosmopolitan city, offering a rich mix of culture,
history, shopping, community life and the arts. At the heart of this vibrant community is Birmingham
City Council (BCC), which comprises 11 parliamentary constituencies, 39 electoral wards and more
than one million people. Around 1994 senior management made a decision to move from a centralised
IT structure to increased autonomy over buying and outsourcing of IT services by departments. As a

result, the role of central IT became more of a support function (Tricia Thrupp, CRM Project Manager
at BCC IT Services) According to Willcocks and Margetts (1994) the newness and attractiveness
(convenience/pricing) of technology led many public sector organisations, including BCC, to expose
themselves to consultancy and supplier markets.
The following enlarges on the impact of the external context on the internal context, affecting
BCC’s IT strategic planning (Pettigrew 1997). According to Tricia Thrupp, each department at BCC
over the years has become increasingly autonomous in terms of its IT:
“We’ve got very few truly corporate solutions. We’ve got a finance system and we’ve got an HR
system, beyond that, because we’ve got lots of different businesses and we’ve tried to look at SIP for
example. But it always needs so much tweaking when it gets out into the departments that it’s
always cheaper to go and buy an off-the-shelf propriety Leisure system / propriety Environmental
Services system / propriety Museum system.”
According to this CRM project manager, ‘vanilla’ applications seemed to be popular in BCC
as they require less in-house expertise, a general trend elsewhere also (Parr and Shanks 2000) Tony
Glew, head of BCC IT up to October 2001, justified outsourcing in this way:
“When I was here I was the Head of IT and I had a staff of about 70 or 80 IT staff, but the IT staff
were business analysts and system analysts and they weren’t programmers. There were one or two
people who were experts in Lotus Notes, but we didn’t have programmers like COBOL
programmers or anything like that. The programming assignments had all been outsourced to IT
NET in 1989.”
In-house implementation and development expertise during that period was limited. In
particular, it lacked programmers; IT expertise was in the form of business or system analysts.
According to Glew, when they chose new packages they really had to be good, and not require a lot of
technical skill to make them work. Thus BCC lacked a balanced mix of technical and business
expertise, something seen as an inhibitor in previous implementation studies (see for example, Parr
and Shanks 2000). As a result, the role of the IT centre was diverted into supporting departments
which would go out to buy solutions to meet their individual needs.
Various applications developed without consideration of a strategy for integration. Tricia
Thrupp saw system integration as a particularly difficult task:
“Everything’s a balancing act, isn’t it? But that’s the situation we’ve inherited and that’s why
today (2004) when you say, ‘Try to join things up.’ Why are we so keen on trying to get an
integration strategy together that enables us to do that? Because it isn’t simply a case of saying!
Well we’ve got four or five core systems; we’ve got hundreds of systems out there, hundreds and
hundreds that do all sorts of different things in different ways.”
Thus it would seem that IT solutions were bought in by different departments with little regard
for cross departmental integration resulting in similar technology bottlenecks as recorded by Holland
and Ben (1999) in their study of ERP systems implementation. BCC has realised over the last few
years that it is not efficient as an organisation and a lot of things that have been done on the
re-organisation of IT since 1999 have been about trying to re-establish standards, though not without
difficulties:
“But you can only go so far, with our re-organisation. I’d have loved to have said, ‘Right! All IT
staff are now centralised.’ But that’s going too far because the departments have (are used to) their
autonomy and won’t release.” (Tricia Thrupp).
The literature suggests that subcultures formed as a result of the above IT autonomy may have
different interests, expectations and power (Long and Fahey 2000). A further investigation (below) of
these subcultures in different departments will assist in understanding knowledge transfer
mechanisms.
4.2

Impact of Political Directives In The ‘Outer Context’
It is important to understand the larger political context and its impacts for a UK city council
like Birmingham. According to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2000), the government has
stated its commitment to promoting continuous improvement in local government services through
electronic service delivery (ESD), to achieve the target of 100% ESD capability by 2005. Furthermore,

this vision intends to modernise the way public sector delivers policies, programmes and services to its
customers/citizens. The above illustrates the government deadlines and speed of new legislation that
Willcocks and Margetts (1994) talk about as pressure factors, pushing the organisations towards
consultant and supplier markets.
Interactive Electronic Government (IEG) aims to build local government services around
customer/citizens’ needs rather than the organisational structures of service providers, giving its
customers a one-stop service. All levels of government have been encouraged to make full use of the
potential for electronic service delivery to improve the responsiveness and quality of service. This is
where the IEG directive links with the idea of a CRM system, as proponents of CRM systems claim to
facilitate a one-stop shop for customers. New technology should not replace personal contact but it
should make it better supported (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2002). The Government's
agenda, according to the office of Deputy Prime Minister, has been driven by social expectations and
comparisons with the private sector - such as people's expectations to be able to deal with
organisations by many different means, not just traditional face-to-face contact.
4.3

The Internal Context at BCC
In this section the subcultures and subculture-gaps at BCC are discussed, using theories from
the literature review (Louis 1985; Fincham 1994; Grindley 1992; Hinton 1994; Kumar and BjornAndersen 1990). Several subcultures were identified during the research at BCC. The CRM project
was originally perceived to have an IT-led approach. The revised approach after Tony Glew left in
October 2001 was perceived as business led. According to James Druary (Contract Manager,
Corporate Customer Relations), one group of people (led by Tony Glew) had a positive attitude
towards CRM implementation with an integrative approach, while the other group (led by Sarah
Wood) had a less integrative, more ‘call-answering’ focus:
“As a result of that, the priority has gone into that area rather than developing CRM, collecting a
lot of data about customers, using that data to shape services in the future. That’s the area that’s
still weak at the moment (mid 2004).”
This points to a cultural gap between the social and technical (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis,
1994), that is, in this context, between the human resource department, service agents, end users, and
some managers on the one hand, and the programmers, IT technicians, developers and systems
analysts on the other. The IT-led group, including Tony Glew, David Hall and the consultant Bill
Newman, were concerned about establishing a strong link between the front- and back-offices using
middleware to integrate the system, as we have seen in other systems implementations (Holland and
Ben 1999; Louis 1985). Initially, the middleware design proved insufficient, and this slowed down the
process of implementation. Hence, a non-integrative approach, under Sarah Wood, supported by Julie
Bullen and other like-minded people, was taken on board as a better alternative. The problematic
nature of the differing cultures created a further hurdle with some serious consequences in the form of
people leaving the project, thus slowing down implementation progress – an issue with parallels in
other implementations (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 1994; Price Waterhouse 1991, 1992).
General problems arose when different departments wanted to communicate with each other
without the necessary system integration. This situation was not helped by the fact that departments
had gathered knowledge over the years that some found hard to release without seeing any clear
benefits. As Davenport et al. (1998) argue, individuals sitting with certain knowledge may have fear of
losing their power or position by releasing their knowledge completely. At BCC, according to David
Hall:
“This type of knowledge hoarding has given rise to vertical silos in BCC at a departmental level.”
According to Leonard-Barton and Kraus (1985), making the knowledge residing in such
vertical silos more mobile across departments is an important facilitator of implementation. Such
knowledge possessed by the departments can be in explicit or implicit state, both codified and noncodified (Perrin 1990). In other words, it can be in descriptive, prescriptive or tacit form (Vincenti
1993; Nonaka et al. 1995; Herschbach 1995). It becomes vital to investigate the elements that facilitate
the transfer of knowledge residing in various forms across the departmental subcultures at BCC.

4.4

Moving Towards CRM: The ‘Content’ of IT-Related Change
Here we address the Content factor in our data-gathering framework. By late 1998 BCC was
concerned about their public call-answering capacity. BCC had been looking at establishing a
corporate contact centre for a number of years. According to several respondents, one of the key
requirements identified was the need to set up some form of corporate access database. By doing so,
they could record and monitor the contacts and “that would be an important component of any
contact centre that was established - and that’s when we started looking at CRM as an issue” (Tony
Glew).
According to David Hall, Chief Executive, Sir Michael Lyons, at the time, was well aware of
the protracted dialogue that had taken place. He further argued that it had never really had a project
champion, so when Tony Glew suggested that Central IT take up the initiative, the CEO endorsed his
suggestion. David Hall further suggested that the CEO was most keen to improve the communications
with the public, and felt that everything was too spread over the Authority. The project thus gained a
project sponsor in the form of the CEO, one of the strong recommendations coming out of parallel
research on IT project implementation (see for example Goodhue et al. 2002; Willcocks and Sykes
2000).
4.5

Preparations for the Process
This section will begin to link ‘Content’ with ‘Process’ and highlight the mechanisms and
patterns embedded in the interaction between the stakeholders and their impact on the process of
implementation (Pettigrew 1997).
Tony Glew started to work with the idea of a CRM system as a solution to the BCC call
answering problem:
“There’s another key character, who is still working here called Gerry McMullen. Gerry is
brilliant. Gerry sees things, brings them all together and if you ask the right questions, out it all
comes into a strategic whole. It was Gerry that told me, ‘This is what’s its really about, Tony, not
just answering the phone but connecting the agents to the back office systems and logging
everything in the middle.’…. So immediately we started developing the idea for a government
computing conference’
The first big presentation on CRM was in 1999 to a government computing conference. On
that occasion Tony Glew had spoken of every Authority in the country having its own CRM, but all
linked together through the Internet, so any citizen anywhere could actually link into the CRM. Tony’s
idea was received positively. The BCC Deputy Leader (Andy Howell) was interested in promoting
modern techniques. He got Tony Glew and Sarah Wood (Strategic Director of Resources) together and
gave them the project go-ahead. Significantly Tony and Sarah held different and potentially
conflicting underlying views that did not surface until a later stage of the CRM project, an issue that
appeared also in research by Pliskin et al. (1993).
According to Krogh,, Ichijo, and Nonaka, (2000), effective knowledge creation depends on
the physical, virtual and emotional context of an organisation. They discuss the importance of the
notion of reciprocity of relationships. When a relationship is felt to be reciprocal then a trust develops
which can work to overcome power-based relationships. Relationships between Tony Glew and Sarah
Wood were not felt to be reciprocal. This resulted in lack of trust from both sides. Their psychological
contracts were low on trust and loyalty, resulting from conflicting ideas, motives and interests. A
mutual perspective towards CRM Frontline was absent (Boland and Tenkasi 1996).
4.6
Outsourcing Of Implementation
According to Tony Glew, BCC needed somebody that had the right implementation experience.
Consultant Bill Newman, who had a good track record, was employed from May 2000. However,
much of his experience was from the private sector, which differs from the public sector in several
distinctive ways (Willcocks and Harrow 1992). Together with Bill Newman, three more consultants
were hired.
One of these consultants was John Harlow, with a background in work study for over 20 years
in the public sector. He also had experience in call centres and script design. He was hired to do

business process re-engineering in terms of process analysis in relation to the targeted areas for a
contact centre. Peter McMahon and Derek Forland were the other two consultants. Their initial role
was to investigate neighbourhood offices and council tax. Bill Newman’s role was to manage the
consultants and also to act as an advisor to Tony Glew. The hired consultants lacked specific
knowledge of BCC culture and its operations. This necessitated their working closely with BCC if
they were to acquire that type of knowledge and share their own knowledge in order to facilitate
knowledge transfer in both directions (Bowen 1998).
From May 2000 onwards, BCC went through a process of putting requirements together with
a view to going out to tender. Birmingham had only 39 systems-facing people, so:
“We’d better get in bed with somebody who’s very good at doing integration, because we
aren’t.” (Tony Glew).
BCC entered into contract negotiations with Lagan, the provider of software called Frontline.
BCC also went on a site visit to Sussex Police in Brighton during October/November 2000 to observe
their gazetteer using a CRM application. In December 2000, the decision to sign with Lagan was
made, the contract being finalised in March 2001. An off-the-shelf package was chosen, that could be
configured and implemented fairly quickly. There were also possibilities for back-office integration
through an in-built XML facility in the package.
4.7
The ‘Process’ of CRM Implementation January 2001 – April 2002
This section covers the ‘how’ of the implementation - how things were done and how they were
perceived by different stakeholders (Pettigrew 1985, 1997).
4.7.1

Staff Retention Issues
During Jan 2001, Julie Bullen was appointed as a business manager for the CRM project.
According to Bob Carter, temporary head of IT:
“It was felt that the project was over-weighted with IT and light on business need. The business
need according to Sarah Wood, Strategic Director of Resources was to bring back the focus towards
call answering issues.”
According to a 2001 Citizen Mori poll, the number of people who could actually get through
to BCC was as low as 10% on first call.
4.7.2 CRM project manager resigns from the CRM project
David Hall was the CRM Project Manager when Julie Bullen arrived during May 2001. Julie Bullen
and David Hall got off to a bad start. David Hall got on very well with the consultant, but Julie Bullen
did not. This could have perhaps caused some of the subsequent problems:
“It was a delicate issue but perhaps it did come down a lot to personalities at the end of the day.”
(Tricia Thrupp)
According to Tricia Thrupp, shortly after that, when Julie arrived and had different views
about how the project should be run, it was felt better that David Hall leave the project. Furthermore,
with the arrival of Julie Bullen as business manager, the project changed direction towards a call
answering focus and away from the integrated approach focus. David Hall did not share that view
either, and duly left the project. That is also when Tricia Thrupp became the CRM Project Manager:
“My management style is different from Dave’s management style, I had clear views about where I
wanted it to go and they didn’t quite fit with the views of both Dave and the consultant (Bill
Newman). I didn’t feel there was enough business ownership so I decided that we needed to refresh
the team.”(Julie Bullen).
David Hall felt let down by the senior management, as he was there before Julie arrived. The
non-reciprocal psychological contracts present between Sarah Wood and Tony Glew can also be seen
between Julie Bullen and David Hall. A process of ‘mutual perspective taking’ where distinctive
individual knowledge is exchanged, evaluated and integrated with that of the others in the
organisation, was missing in the above case also, with, following Boland and Tenkasi (1996), equally
deleterious consequences.

4.7.3

Head of IT (Tony Glew) left BCC (October 2001)
Sarah Wood wanted to outsource the call centre management to Vertex, who were partners
with Lagan. Tony Glew, on the other hand, had a view that it might slow things down. He was keen on
back-office integration in the system. His view was shared by both David Hall and Bill Newman.
Strategically, Sarah took a different view. According to Tony Glew:
“Her view was ‘To hell with boys playing…. much more important is - Get the telephones
answered!’”
Tony Glew gave six months notice before leaving during October 2001.
4.7.4

Change of direction in the ‘Process’ (October 2001)
Sarah Wood decided to outsource to Vertex as Tony Glew left during Oct 2001. Outsourcing
to Vertex was more of a political decision as there were issues with regard to the performance of
officers providing service. Andy Howell appeared to be the person pushing this idea forward.
In April 2001 consultant Bill Newman presented a report to Sarah Wood, in which he
promoted the idea of integration between front and back office using Frontline. That idea was never
acted upon. Bill Newman was relieved of his services. The rest of the consultants were assigned the
role of designing scripts for the contact centre. In normal circumstances the City Council would have
moved all the call centre staff over to the contact centre, necessitating transfer of undertakings legally.
The politicians were not prepared to do that. According to Bob Carter, they seconded people from
BCC to Vertex. In this arrangement, the management of the staff was done by Vertex. However, all
the staff’s terms and conditions were managed by the City Council.
4.7.5

Stakeholder commitment
BCC CRM implementation had senior management sponsorship in the form of Sir Michael
Lyons, the chief executive, who saw a CRM system in action on his trip to Brisbane. According to
David Hall:
“Andy Howell saw this as a good opportunity to kill two birds with one stone. One, this would
eliminate the call answering issues that the city was having. The second, that implementation of a
CRM system will be in line with the government directive.”
As Glew and Wood started to work on the implementation plan, their differing opinions
became more explicit. They may have started with a mutual understanding on the surface (Anderson
and Schalk 1998). As they interacted more closely and creative abrasion took place, the implicit part
of their psychological contract became more explicit, and, following (Makin et al. 1996), more
obviously misaligned. Where the psychological contract was previously implicit, this had resulted in a
lack of clarity for both parties on the level of their disagreement (Maken et al. 1996).
Creative abrasion can positively influence performance (Leonard-Barton 1995). In this case,
however, it created a divide and slowed down the CRM project. This also resulted in Tony Glew’s
resignation, and subsequent suspension of the original ‘Frontline’ development in favour of the revised
‘Contact Birmingham Frontline’ solution.
The arrival of Julie Bullen as business manager decisively changed the direction of the project
towards a call-answering focus and away from the integrated approach focus. David Hall did not share
that view either and left the project. This narrowed down the stakeholder base. There were also hopes
to keep the customer contact centre internal. According to one executive:
“we’d been working on the assumption that the call centre would…. probably be internally
run and managed and it was a bit of a shock … some people had sort of seen roles for themselves
within the subsequent development of the organisation and I’m going to run this and I’m going to
be doing that as we were sort of bought into it, and that was suddenly taken away and it was going
to be a managed service. At that point a lot of people probably lost a little bit of interest.”(Richard
Budden, Business Manager, Environmental Services)
Other changes at the senior management level influenced subsequent developments.
According to David Hall, deputy leader Andy Howell remained in the picture for a while providing
support to Tony Glew and Sarah Wood. Sir Michael Lyons left with 12 months’ notice.

4.7.6

User training issues in the ‘process’ of IT related change
The training provided by Vertex to the contact centre agents was more in the form of
descriptive knowledge, which included what the system can do and how the written scripts can be
used to answer the incoming calls (Vincenti 1993; Nonaka et al. 1995; Herschbach 1995). However,
there were some issues regarding the training.
“I felt it was inadequate, I felt it was poorly managed, I didn’t feel that the trainers were aware of
how to utilise the system any better than the people they were training.” (Abid Hayat, Contact
Birmingham Duty Manager)
“They hadn’t for instance, (they didn’t deliver) very high quality training materials to go with the
training so the staff were, having been trained, walking away and not having anything they could
refer to.” (Tricia Thrupp)
“I think we neglected, I think we could have spent more time on helping Vertex employees
understand how the Council works.” (Julie Bullen)
In our analysis this resulted from Vertex not having enough knowledge about BCC departmental
culture. Their interactions with BCC were not on a prolonged basis, did not allow any creative
abrasion to take place (Newell et al. 2002). Following Boland and Tenkasi (1996), this resulted in a
training not based on mutual perspective taking. On our analysis, there was an agreement at senior
management level that saw mutual psychological contracts in place. However, this agreement was not
shared by the people on the floor. According to Leonard-Barton and Kraus (1985) it is important to
plan for the transfer of knowledge from the old operations, in which people knew the materials and the
product very well, to the new processes. In the BCC situation secondees from the back offices were
put in the contact centre environment, but their knowledge was not exploited to complement and
enhance the quality of the end-user training.
In our analysis, the BCC senior management when signing the contract with Vertex had an
illusion of consensus which did not expose the innermost feelings of individuals involved (Gee 1992).
Hence it resulted in inadequate training material and lack of communication between the parties. The
BCC staff were more trained and experienced with considerable codified knowledge regarding BCC
and its culture. More than half of the contact centre staff were existing BCC staff as secondees. Their
training needs were, in many cases, different from those of newcomers (non-secondees).
4.7.7 The system goes live: developments from March 2002
According to Tricia Thrupp:
“To start with, five BCC services were supposed to go on board with Frontline. This got reduced to
three. It was very much a political directive as to which went in and which did not. BCC did an
awful lot of work with Leisure, and then all of a sudden they dropped Leisure because Revenues
became more important, so they just had to dump all the Leisure work.”
Moreover, the pilot did not involve collective testing. Each department did their own tests
with the system. This did not enable any close interaction between the different departments. As many
respondents reported, differing psychological contracts undoubtedly inhibited the free flow of
knowledge from one department to another. The sense of shared benefits which could have helped in
the mobility of knowledge silos and hoarding was missing at the departmental level. Just as seriously,
there was no external customer involvement in the process of implementation of Frontline. In fact
BCC had tried it before and it had not worked. According to Bob Carter:
“It was much better to take something to the citizens, get it changed and validated, rather than
giving them a blank piece of paper and saying, ‘This is what we are going to do. How do you want
to do it?’”
The system went live in March 2002. This included the contact centre using the Frontline
solution/software, providing services for Environmental Waste, Neighbourhood Advice and Council
Tax. Prior to that, from about July/August 2001, a pilot of the CRM system with Environmental
Services was done. However, the system went live without physically having a contact centre in place.
It was done in the existing office. The product was used to see how it interacted with BCC’s back-end

system, the values it generated and problems it caused. There were some major issues with that pilot,
around the technical side in getting it to talk correctly with the back-end system. Another issue was
that Environmental Services at that point were in the process of renewing their back-end system.
Difficulties with the pilot indicate that, against Leonard-Barton and Kraus (1985) a clear purpose, well
defined and communicated, was missing.
4.8

‘Outcomes’ in the CRM implementation at BCC: From 2002-2004
Outcomes in this case are discussed in terms of how the system process was shaped by the
history, internal and external contexts, and how the content and process have affected the performance
of the users of the system (Pettigrew 1997). We analyse how our findings resonate with the extant
research literature.
4.8.1

The window of opportunity for adoption starts to close (Orlikowski and Tyre 1994)
As the users of the system became more familiar with the systems, the workarounds, shortcuts
and ‘tricks of the trade’ started to surface (Vincenti 1984; Orlikowski & Iacano 2001). According to
one non-secondee end-user, the call centre agents tried to use the Frontline CRM system as much as
they could, but over time they realised that answering the calls was taking too long, so they made
notes while answering the calls, using the system as little as possible.
Interviews with the agents showed that they learned to take notes manually while on call and
then, after the call, put the logs on the system - especially with agents from the revenue and benefits
section. A brief interview with the recruitment section in early 2004 showed that they used Frontline
CRM for salutation purposes only. They then had to log into the back office system separately. This
applied in both Benefits and Revenues departments. Thus, as system adaptation time passed, people
were finding new ways of working with the Frontline system. The system was getting adapted by the
users rather than users adopting the system, as Orlikowski and Tyre (1994) found in their study also.
4.8.2

Differing perceptions, interests and expectations (Long and Fahey 2000)
Derek Lee from Neighbourhood Office claimed that his department was going to play a
leading role in the CRM Frontline implementation. He argued:
“My role then was Constituency Manager for some Neighbourhood Offices but also leading
on IT issues generally. I had always had a direct link into central IT over our use of new
technology, and at that time it was anticipated that the corporate call centre would become part of
the network of Neighbourhood Offices. So I was part of the initial set-up of that organisation and..
a lot of the tender documentation was based upon CRM work we did two or three years previously.”
He further argued that the Contact Centre should have been under their responsibility, as the
front line for BCC. However, the contact centre (Vertex) management at BCC has had differing
perceptions. Some seemed to have an opinion that by 2004 CRM Frontline was now doing what it was
supposed to do, in other words, providing help as a tool to answer the incoming calls. There are some
who thought that it could do better than that:
“I manage the voice network at the City Council and we receive 40 million calls per annum from
the public, a miniscule percentage of that is handled by the call centre, a miniscule percentage. The
potential for further cascading the CRM solution has not been tapped yet.” (David Hall)
The benefit with the externally managed contact centre has been that there are, within the
contract, clear quantifiable performance indicators. However there are other issues:
“What it hasn’t addressed is the qualitative aspects. Whilst people now get through - and that was
an initial huge win for the City because there was a lot of bad publicity around the fact that people
couldn’t get through to us and to other departments, but I don’t think there was much put in the
contract around the qualitative issues, as I am now finding as a business user.”
The eventual aim into late 2004 was that Frontline CRM would be a fully integrated solution
and then BCC would start to get benefits. Training had improved, according to Abid Hayat, talking in
late 2003. Some feedback from the staff has been picked up by the trainers and resulted in some
improvements in training the newcomers, as recommended for example by Vincenti (1993). However,

some of the contact centre advisors still do not see the Frontline system as a facilitating tool in their
work. The Frontline system was slow and broke down at least once or twice a day. There were too
many screens to juggle with, and too many systems which fail to communicate with each other.
Contact centre staff also showed their concerns regarding the management of different systems in use:
“I think in England they use too many Chiefs and not enough Indians.” (Abid Hayat)
The contact centre managed by Vertex went live in March 2003. It was divided into three
sections - advisors handling calls regarding environmental services and neighbourhood advice;
benefits and revenue; and recruitment services (live early 2004). Advisors in all the sections used
Frontline CRM system to read scripts, in order to correctly use the salutations. In handling
environmental services calls, the Frontline system uses a middleware called ‘Connect’, to interact with
the back-office system called ‘Panorama’. Call centre agents are able to provide help to callers on
specific issues, for example missed bin collections. However, only BCC secondees are given access to
the full version of Panorama. Thus non-secondees with a customer query pass on the information
manually to the secondees in order to achieve a resolution.
Secondees from BCC were trained separately from non-secondees in the Frontline CRM
system. A collective training of call centre staff could have provided an opportunity for the staff to
interact with each other on an informal basis. Such interaction on an informal level might perhaps
have helped to start the process of mutual perspective taking (Boland and Tenkasi 1996) and a shared
ownership, potentially leading to ‘mutual high obligation’ psychological contracts thus facilitating
knowledge transfer (Shore and Barksdale 1998).
According to Abid Hayat, secondees carried with them the BCC culture, whereas the nonsecondees hired by Vertex to handle the incoming calls did not. Secondees were more aware of the
process loop in handling incoming calls because of their BCC background. This knowledge possessed
by the secondees has not been exploited fully. The training was short, only three to four weeks, and
was different for secondees as compared to non-secondees (Wathne et al. 1996). ‘T-shaped skills’ and
‘knowing of what others know’ could not be fully developed due to the shortage of time and lack of
prolonged cross-cultural interaction between secondees and non-secondees (Bakhtin 1981; Krauss and
Fussell 1991; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Iansiti 1993). According to Abid Hayat there is very little
interaction between the three sections present at the contact centre. The chances of creative abrasion
taking place are limited. The common coffee or lunch room is mainly used by the recruitment services.
The limited interaction that takes place is in more formal types of setting. Lack of informal settings
may work as an inhibitor to the transfer of tricks of the trade at the contact centre. This combined with
lack of ‘mutual high obligation’ psychological contracts due to the departmental subculture (Shore and
Barksdale 1998) and vertical knowledge silos have, in our analysis, undoubtedly inhibited knowledge
transfer across the departments and between the front-office and back-office in a CRM environment

5.

Further Analysis

We have included some preliminary analysis already in the process of structuring the case history.
In this summary analysis section the framework adopted to structure and explain events and evidence
longitudinally (Pettigrew 1985; Willcocks and Margetts 1994) is again used to highlights the key
points raised in the analysis regarding the CRM Frontline implementation (see Figure 2).
5.1
Emerging Issues
In many ways the case history demonstrates not only the importance of previously neglected
knowledge and psychological factors in systems implementation, but in particular how lack of
knowledge sharing, failure of tacit knowledge transfer, and unconnected psychological contracts can
inhibit systems implementation. Applying a longitudinal research approach also reveals the origins of
these sub-optimal outcomes – at least sub-optimal from systems promoter, external customer and
governmental stakeholder perspectives. Referring to Figure 2, The origins can be found in the
historical decision to give departments autonomy over IT decisions and purchasing, resulting in
departmental knowledge and psychological contractual silos; in the functional hierarchical structure of

the organization creating both vertical and horizontal stratification in knowledge possession and
psychological loyalties; and in decisions to outsource bringing in to play further differential
knowledge bases and psychological contracts without applying sufficiently the means to dissolve the
resulting barriers to knowledge transfer, learning and mutual perspective-taking.
These fissures in organization led to sub-cultures developing, embodying differing
perceptions, interests and loyalties and objectives. In such circumstances politics breed, and become
particularly visible in times of technological change (Pettigrew 1985; Willcocks et al. 2002), and as
the case shows, during the development and implementation of a key system such as CRM At the
same time external contextual pressures forced organizational stakeholders into action, with one group
clustered around the Strategic Director and Business Manager and what we have called the ‘callanswering’ focus winning out against the integration approach supported more by the Head of IT, and
for which the vendor Lagan had been originally selected to support. In terms of internal context we
identified many examples of knowledge hoarding in vertical solos and of differential psychological
contracts resulting in subsequent non-cooperative, and less informed behaviours relative to systems
implementation. All this made the process of systems implementation much more difficult than it
could have been had the issue of knowledge sharing and enhancement, and shared psychological
contracts been addressed through, for example, use of mediators to facilitate communication in non
reciprocal relationships, training and education, team-building, changed ways of working and effective
end-user involvement.
The process of change revealed real knowledge and psychological contractual issues. The
project team at BCC went through its ups and downs. The CRM program manager resigned soon after
the new business manager’s arrival. More people left, including the chief executive and the head of IT
services as a result of a power struggle and conflicts (Jehn 1995). Frequent changes of personnel may
not have allowed the group to attain cohesiveness contributing to a less productive output (Kirkman
and Shapiro 1997). BCC re-aligned their strategy and moved back from a complete integration
approach to having a call answering system with limited integration. These events can be related to
knowledge and psychological contractual issues. Knowledge silos found at BCC were at different
hierarchical levels. At senior management level the sub-cultural gap between Sarah Wood’s team and
Tony Glew’s created a divide. The divide continued with David Hall getting replaced with a new
business manager. Due to a lack of ‘mutual perspective taking’ and ‘shared understanding’ the
psychological contracts were more imposed than ‘mutual high obligation’ in type (shore and
Barksdale 1998). This inhibited the process of developing positive creative abrasion, thus resulting in
knowledge hoarding in the silos. This research suggests that psychological contracts play an important
role in knowledge transfer. It also suggests that imposed psychological contracts (employee under
obligation) tend to promote power based relationships (shore and Barksdale 1998). Explicit elements
of psychological contracts between senior management and end-users include a sense of obligation to
work, and job security. Importantly implicit elements of psychological contracts remain hidden
(Makin et al. 1996) producing illusions of consensus, which influence and inhibit adoption and
acceptance of the CRM system.
5.2

Outcomes
It is particularly interesting to look at what happens where, in this particular systems
implementation, the Process issues as listed in Figure 2 were not addressed. Knowledge transfer and
development are all delayed because of low staff retention, imposed psychological contracts, low user
involvement in the process of change, lack of external user involvement, declining senior management
commitment, and limited user training. As Willcocks et al. (2002) and Walton (1989) have shown,
these insufficiencies will have knock-on effects in terms of the Outcomes once the system has been
implemented (see Figure 2).

IT History at BCC
•
•
•
•
•

•

•

•

•
•
•

Lack of in-house expertise e.g.
lack of programmers
Programming assignments were
outsourced to IT NET
A culture decision within the
organisation gave departments a
lot of freedom
Central IT had a more supporting
role.
Vanilla systems were bought
without consideration of a
strategy for integration

Context (Internal)
Top down approach; Decision to
take on board CRM was made at the
senior management level by three
executives.
Subculture gap between call
answering focused subculture led by
Sarah Wood (Strategic Director)
and integration focussed subculture
led by Tony Glew (Head of IT).
IT led culture vs. Business led
culture at middle management level;
e.g. David Hall (CRM Programme
Manager) vs. Julie Bullen (Business
Manager).
Departmental vs. Corporate culture
Departmental silos.
Knowledge hoarding in vertical
silos

Figure 2.

IT-Related Change
•

•
•

Content
Phased approach was used, however the
project changed its course of direction;
from integration approach to call
answering focus
Lagan was chosen with integration
approach in mind
Outsourcing the management of Call
Centre to Vertex

•

•

Context (External)
• Government deadlines and
speed of new legislation
• (BCC) has been given the task
of ensuring that all the services
are available to the citizens
through electronic means by
2005
• Customers demanding better
service, e.g. calls not getting
though

•

•

Process
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Staff retention issues indicate that several
stakeholders did not follow through the
project; e.g. leaving of Tony Glew (Head
of IT), David Hall (CRM Programme
Manager), Bill Newman (consultant), Sir
Michael Lyons (CEO).
End-user involvement came at a later stage
Lack of External end-user involvement
User commitment was linked with
imposed psychological contracts.
Management support thinned out as the
project progressed
User training was done without taking into
account the BCC culture and its
expectation.
System went live a year after the contract
was signed with Lagan.

•

•

•
•

Outcomes
Differing stakeholder perceptions,
expectations and interests; e.g.
Sarah Wood vs. Tony Glew,
David Hall vs. Julie Bullen,
secondees vs. non-secondees.
Differential interests and motives
at different levels of hierarchy
may not have helped in
establishing mutual psychological
contracts (Makin et al. 1996).
The system is getting adapted by
the users rather than users
adopting the system.
T-shaped skills and knowing of
what others know could not be
fully developed due to the
shortage of time and lack of
prolonged cross cultural
interaction between secondees
and non-secondees.
Secondees at Vertex are more
aware of the process loop in
handling incoming calls because
of their BCC background.
Advisors at Vertex use Frontline
CRM system only to read scripts,
in order to correctly use the
salutations.
The vertical silos, between the
departments, need further
investigation.
Knowledge transfer, retention and
exploitation by stakeholders of
the call handling loop need
further investigation.

Summary of The Analysis Using Pettigrew (1985, 1991) & Willcocks and Margetts (1994)
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Management support at senior management level was provided for the project. The support
thinned out as senior people at BCC started to leave. Also the training seems to have been rushed. The
initial motive behind bringing in the CRM system at BCC was to get the calls answered. User
commitment was linked very much with imposed psychological contracts (Rousseau 1995). At BCC
users have subsequently found work-arounds in terms of using the manual methods to answer a call
rather than using the CRM system itself. However, they do end up using the system to ensure the job
requirement. Users have not been able to see the shared benefits fully yet and hence the psychological
contracts are not completely of ‘mutual high obligation’ type (Shore and Barksdale 1998). User
commitment has potential links with job security (Davenport et al. 1998). Mutual perspective taking
has not happened fully due to the secondee/ non-secondee relationship situation at BCC (Boland and
Tenkasi 1996). Furthermore, the content of an apparently mutual perspective may not have been
allowed to surface or be challenged thus avoiding any interpretations which could shake up the
illusion of consensus between stakeholders of the system (Gee 1992). As the project progressed and
the innermost feelings were exposed people started to leave the project. The achievement of a new
definition of the situation in which all participants can share has yet (as at mid-2004) to take place at
its full capacity (Habermas 1979). Subsequent user commitment may also have been affected by the
lack of involvement in the decision making process in buying the system initially. Decisions to buy the
systems were taken at senior management level. End-users were involved in the implementation
process at a later stage. No external user involvement was taken into consideration. Training has been
an issue. At BCC it was done without taking into account the BCC culture and its expectations.
The system went live a year after the contract was signed with the vendor. Lagan
(manufacturer of CRM Frontline) also brought in Cavendish to help with the integration of the back
office systems. Subsequently BCC also outsourced their call centre management to Vertex. Some
consequences of outsourcing included some people resigning from the project and secondee / nonsecondee relationship issues.
Partly as a consequence of these factors, staff turnover at the floor level has been very high.
This does not allow staff interactions to come to a state of mutual perspective-taking where shared
learning can take place (Boland and Tenkasi 1996). At BCC people from Contact Birmingham do not
have many interactions with the back office. The secondees feel left out at The Contact Centre.
Furthermore their contract with BCC does not allow them to be upgraded to a team leader position
Non-secondees, on the other hand, can get promoted. Relationships at the contact centre between the
secondees and the outsourced management are more power-based in style. This has resulted in a
scenario where BCC secondees with a lot of experience and BCC cultural knowledge feel inferior to
their non-seconded colleagues. There has also been a high turnover of staff at senior level at BCC.
This has not helped the project to get stabilised or the new staff to settle either. The resulting
psychological contracts are more of an imposed than a ‘mutual high obligation’ type (Shore and
Barksdale 1998). Creative abrasion that could facilitate the development of ‘T-shaped skills’ and
transfer of ‘tricks of the trade’ rarely takes place. Stakeholders at different level of hierarchy interact
with each other from within their silos and the transfer of knowledge has tended to remain limited to
the silos.
The micro mechanisms, for example psychological contracts, underlying the development of
‘mutual perspective’, ‘shared mental space’, ‘T-shaped skills’ and ‘knowing of what others know’
need further investigation in order to fully understand the elements that inhibit or facilitate the transfer
of tricks of the trade and work-arounds across the sub-cultures of a post CRM implementation
environment

7.

Conclusion

By mid-2004 BCC was at the adaptation and acceptance stage where BCC were trying to
develop the system further, to promote the integration, and streamline the processes as much as
possible. The impact of knowledge creation, retention and exploitation on the ongoing process of
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implementation is of high importance to the organisational promoters of CRM, as is the building of
improved psychological contracts based on optimal utilization of the system.
The exploratory research here has sought to extend the analysis of IT implementation to CRM
systems, and to include in that analysis knowledge issues – including tacit knowledge transfer,
knowledge silos, psychological contracts. A longitudinal approach has elicited how contextual,
cultural, political and structural factors have influenced propensity to share knowledge and pursue
common cause in the CRM implementation and use at Birmingham City Council, and the factors that
could alleviate knowledge bottlenecks and facilitate more optimal utilization of the system. While our
initial research questions were cast in an exploratory form, the research has only confirmed what our
initial reading of the literature led us to believe – that knowledge issues, and what constructs them, are
not just implicit in all systems implementations, but can be key reasons why a system optimises or
fails in the light of its different stakeholders’ interests.

References
Anderson, N. and René S. (1998) The Psychological Contract in Retrospect and Prospect, Journal of
Organizational Behaviour, 19, pp. 637-647.
Bakhtin, M.M. (1981) "Discourse in the novel", in Holquis, M. (Ed.), The Dialogic Imagination, University
of Texas Press, Austin, TX.
Bartlett, C.A., Goshal, S. (1998) Beyond strategic planning to organisation learning: lifeblood of the
individualized corporation, strategy and leadership. Harper Business, UK & Maxima, Paris, pp. 34-9.
Bell, J. (1992) Doing your research project. Milton Keynes: Open University Press
B. L. Kirkman and D. L. Shapiro (1997) Impact of cultural values on employee resistance to teams: Toward
a model of globalised self-managing work team effectiveness. Academy of Management Review, pp 73057
Bloomfield B. P. and Vurdubaki T. (1994) Negotiating the Boundary between the Technical and the Social
in the Development of IT Systems. Information Technology and People, 7(1), pp. 9-24.
Boland, R. and Tenkasi, R. (1996) Exploring Knowledge diversity in knowledge intensive firms: a new role
for information systems. Journal of Organizational Change Management; Bradford; 9(1), pp. 79-91.
MCB University Press.
Bostrom, R. P. and Heinen, J. S. (1997) ‘MIS Problems and Failures: A Socio Technical Perspective PART
1: The Causes’, MIS Quarterly, September, pp. 17-32
Bowen, T. (1998) Committing to Consultants, outside help requires internal commitment and management
skills. Info World.
Brown, J. (1998) Internet Technology in support of the Concept of the ‘Communities of Practice’. The case
of Xerox. Accounting Management and Information Technologies, 8, 227-236.
Checkland P. B. (1981) Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, Wiley, Chichester.
Ciborra, C. (2000) From Control to Drift. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Cooper R. and Zamud, R. (1990) Information technology implementation research: a technological
diffusion approach. Management Science, 36 (2), pp. 123-39.
Davenport, T.H. et al. (1998) Successful Knowledge Management Projects, Sloan Management Review,
39(4), pp. 43-57.
Davidson, E. (2002) Technology Frames and Framing: A Socio-Cognitive Investigation of Requirements
Determination“ MIS Quarterly (26:4), pp. 329-358.
Davis, G.B. and Olson, M. H. (1985) Management Information Systems: Conceptual Foundations,
Structures and Development, (2nd edition), McGraw-Hill, New York.
Davis, F.D. (1989) Perceived usefulness, perceived case of use, and user acceptance of information
technology, MIS Quarterly. 13(3), pp. 319-339
Denzin, N.K and Lincoln, Y.S. (2000) Handbook of Qualitative research, 2nd Edition, London: Sage
Fahey, L. and Prusak, L. (1998) The Eleven Deadliest Sins of Knowledge Management, California
Management Review, 40(3), pp. 265-276.
Fincham. R. (1994) Computing occupations: organisational power, work transitions and collective mobility.
New Technology, Work & Employment 9 (1), pp. 43-53.
Gee, J.P. (1992) The Social Mind, Bergin and Garvey, New York, NY.
Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures: selected essays. New York: Basic Books.

16

Goodhue L., Wixom H., Watson J. (2002) Business benefits through CRM, MIS Quarterly Executive Vol.1
No.2, , pp. 79-96
Grindley, K. (1991) Bridging the Culture Gap, UNICOM - Seminar, Creating a Strategic Business Based IT
Policy, in Orange, G. (1995), MSc Information Systems - Information Strategy Planning, Unpublished
Course Notes, Leeds Metropolitan University, Leeds.
Habermas, J. (1979) Communication and the Evolution of Society, Beacon Press, Boston, MA.
Herschbach, D. R. (1995): Technology as Knowledge: Implications for Instruction. Journal of Technology
Education, Vol. 7(1).
Hinton, C. M. (1994) Technology Assimilation: Understanding the User - IT Professional Relationship.
Ph.D., Innovation and Technology Assessment Unit, Cranfield University, Cranfield.
Holland, C. and Ben, L. (1999) A Critical Success Factors Model for ERP implementation. IEEE Software,
May/June, 30-35
Iansiti, M. (1993) Real-world R and D: Jumping the product generation gap. Harvard Business Review,
71(3), pp. 138-47
K. Jehn (1995) A multimethod examination of the benefits and detriments of intragroup conflict.
Adminstrative Science Quarterly. pp 256-82
King, N. (1994) The qualitative research interview, in Cassell, C. (ed.) and Symon, G. (ed.) (1994)
Qualitative methods in organisational research, London: Sage
Krogh, G. V., Ichijo, K., & Nonaka, I. (2000) Enabling knowledge creation: How to unlock the mystery of
tacit knowledge and release the power of innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Krauss, R.M. and Fussell, S.R. (1991) Perspective-taking in communication representation of others'
knowledge in reference, Social Cognition, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 2-24.
Kumar, K, and N Bjorn-Andersen (1990) A cross-cultural comparison of IS designer values.
Communications of the ACM 33 (5), pp. 528-538.
Kwon, T. and Zamud, R. (1987) Unifying the fragmented models of information systems implementation,
In Critical Issues in Information Systems Research (eds J. Boland and R. Hirschheim), Wiley, Chichester.
Lawrence, P. R. and Lorsch, J. W. (1967) Organisation and Environment, Harvard Graduate School of
Business Administration.
Leonard-Barton, D., & Kraus, W. A. (1985). Implementing new technology. Harvard Business Review, 63,
102–110.
Leonard-Barton, D. (1995) Well-springs of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining the Sources of Innovation.
Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press.
Long, D. W. D., & Fahey, L. (2000) Diagnosing cultural barriers to knowledge management. The Academy
of Management Executive; Ada, 14(4), pp. 113-127.
Louis, M. (1985) An investigator’s guide to workplace culture. In Frost, Pet al. (Eds.), Organisational
Culture (pp. 73-94)
Maanen, J, Van S. R. and Barley (1985) Cultural Organization, Fragments of a theory, in P. J. Frost et al.
eds. Organizational Culture. Newbury Park, California. Sage, pp.31-53
Mumford, E. Land F. and Hawgood, J. (1978) ‘A Participative Approach to the Design of Computer
Systems’. Impact of Science on Society, 28, (3), pp. 253-256
Newell, S. et al. (2002) Managing Knowledge Work, Palgrave, Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire
Nonaka, I. (1994) A dynamic theory of organisational knowledge creation, Organisational Science, 5(1), pp.
14-37
Nonaka, I. and H. Takeuchi (1995) The Knowledge-Creating Company. Oxford. University Press, Oxford.
Orlikowski, W.J. & Baroudi, J.J. (1991) Studying Information Technology in Organizations: Research
Approaches and Assumptions. Information Systems Research (2), pp. 1-28.
Orlikowski W. and Gash D. (1994) Technology Frames: Making Sense of Information Technology in
Organizations, ACM Transactions on Information Systems (12:2), pp. 174-207
Orlikowski and Tyre (1994) Windows of Opportunity: Temporal Patterns of Technological Adaptation in
Organizations, Organization Science, 5, 1, 1994: 98-118.
Orlikowski W.J and Iacono C.S. (2001) Desperately Seeking the “IT” in IT Research – A call to Theorising
the IT Artifact. Information System Research, Vol. (12), No. 2, pp. 121- 134
Peter J. Makin, Cary L. Cooper, Charles J. Cox. (1996) Organizations and the psychological contract.
Leicester: British Psychological Society.

17

Perrin, J. (1990) The inseparability of technology and work organizations. History and Technology, 7 (1),
pp. 1-13.
Pettigrew, A.M. (1973) The Politics of Organisational Decision Making. Tavistock, London
Pettigrew, A. (1985) The Awakening Giant: Continuity and change in ICI, Blackwell, Oxford.
Pettigrew, A.M. (1997) What is a processual analysis? Scandinavian Journal of Management, vol.13, no.4,
p.337-348
Pliskin, N. et al. (1993) Presumed versus actual organizational culture: managerial implications for
implementation of information systems, The Computer Journal, 36(2), pp. 143-52.
Rogers, E.M (1983) Diffusion of innovations. 3rd Ed. New York: The Free Press
Rousseau, D. M. (1995) Psychological Contracts in Organizations, Sage Publications.
Schultze, R. and Leidner, D. (2002) Studying Knowledge Management in Information Systems research:
Discourses and Theoretical Assumptions. MIS Quarterly, 26, 3, 213-242.
Sels, L., Janssens, M. & Van den Brande, I. (2003) Assessing the nature of psychological contracts: A
validation of six dimensions. Journal of Organizational Behavior. Volume 56(11): 1349–1378.
Shore, L.M. & Barksdale, K (1998) Examining the degree of balance and level of obligation in the
employment relationship: A social exchange approach. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 19, 731–44.
Stanmark, D. (2001) Leveraging Tacit Organizational Knowledge’. Journal of Management Information
Systems, 17, 3, 9-24.
Tafti M. H. A. (2002) Analysis of Factors Affecting Implementation of Customer Relationship Management
Systems . IRMA, Seattle, Idea Group Publishing.
Thibaut, J.W., & Kelley, H.H. (1959) The Social Psychology of Groups. New York, Wiley
Thompson, Mark P. A. & Walsham, Geoff (2004) Placing Knowledge Management in Context.
Journal of Management Studies 41 (5), 725-747.
Tornatzky, L. Klein, K. (1982) Innovation Charechteristics and innovation adoption implementation: a
meta-analysis of findings. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, February, pp. 28-45.
Vincenti, W G. (1984) Technological knowledge without science: The innovation of flush riveting in
American airplanes, ca. 1930-ca. 1950. Technology and Culture, 25(3), pp. 540-576.
Vincenti, W. G. (1993) What Engineers Know and How They Know It. Analytical Studies from
Aeronautical History. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London.
Walton, R. (1989). Up And Running. Harvard Business Press, Boston.
Waterhouse, P. (1991, 1992) ‘The Culture Gap’, Information Technology Review, London, pp. 16-19
Wathne, K., Roos, J. & Von Krogh, G. (1996) Towards a theory of knowledge transfer in a cooperative
context. In G. Von Krogh and J. Roos (Eds), Managing Knowledge: Perspectives on Cooperation and
Competition. London: Sage, pp. 55-81.
Willcocks L. and Harrow J. (1992) Rediscovering public services management. McGraw-Hill Book
Company. London.
Willcocks, L. and Margetts, H. (1994) Risk Assessment and Information Systems. European Journal of
Information Systems, 4(1), pp. 1-12
Willcocks, L. and Sykes, R. (2000) The Role of IT Function. Communications of the ACM, 41(4), 32-38
Willcocks, L. Petherbridge, P. and Olson, N. (2002) Making IT Count: Strategy, Delivery, Infrastructure.
Butterworth, Oxford.
Wright-Cummings, A. (1997) In Willcocks, L., Feeny, D. and Islei, G. (eds.) Managing IT As A Strategic
Resource, McGraw Hill, Maidenhead.
Yin R.K. (1994) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

18

